As the Law Commission has recognised, tribunals are almost as old as the New Zealand legal system itself. The UK, like New Zealand, has long utilised specialised judicial forms, particularly in the administrative sphere, although it has also been somewhat in denial about their use. In effect they arrived along with gorse, rabbits and the British form of government.
The reasons that had led the UK administration to develop specialist tribunals in the latenineteenth century onwards also applied in New Zealand. What was good for the imperial goose was equally good for the colonial gander. Specifically, the growth in the state required mechanisms for making decisions when disputes arose over executive actions. Non-judicial, administrative tribunals were cheaper, more manageable and allowed citizens a right of appeal against the actions of the state that they normally would not have. These reasons were often contradictory, of course, leading to a large variety of tribunals being created for a variety of 1 And those of others following the Westminster model 2 Although the most common method of resolving an administrative dispute in New Zealand is probably internal review or the Ombudsman.
legitimate and, not so legitimate, reasons. It is this variety of drivers that has led to the variety of forms we see today.
To understand the current structure and its fundamental contradictions it important to understand where it came from. Tribunals began as institutions of administrative law and like most of administrative law in New Zealand they were a pragmatic response to an political reality. The first New Zealand Tribunal 3 in common with every tribunal since, was established as a specific response to a particular form of dispute. There was no intention that this institution would become a standard feature of dispute resolution in New Zealand. This institution was established to resolve disputes concerning Military Pensions without recourse to the judiciary, nothing else. The reasons why the ever expanding executive deserves an article in itself, but the perceived need to do so sowed the seeds of the tribunal system's weakness.
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Unlike the courts, tribunals could not be slotted into an overarching system and instead each was established as an individual stand alone institution.
The first tribunals in New Zealand were specialist institutions of administrative law charged with making decisions, or more commonly, reviewing decisions of the state. During the Twentieth Century these "public law" or "administrative" tribunals have been joined by an ever growing group of quasi-public tribunals. These are far less easy to classify and it it at this point that the whole notion of a "tribunal system" (or even a distinct institution recognisable as a tribunal) starts to get messy. By far the largest group of non-administrative tribunals were established to resolve disputes relating to the increasing number of professional bodies regulated by statute. A smaller number were established to resolve specific disputes which arose from statutory regulatory regimes. Finally, other specialist semi-judicial bodies, such as the Disputes Tribunal, were designed to resolve specific varieties of disputes amongst With each new tribunal, the system grew ever more complex and confusing. Duplication was common and many tribunals operated as orphans, lacking resources and cut off from the experience that could be gained from other tribunals. Yet, despite several attempts to mould these disparate institutions into a coherent system of administrative justice, the system remains largely unchanged since the development of the earliest tribunals. The reason why such attempts have failed can largely be attributed to the low priority that tribunals and administrative justice in general has been accorded in New Zealand. The current reform proposals are far from perfect, but they would at least have introduced a much needed degree of coherence into the current structure. 8 For now, the tribunal 'system' in New Zealand remains a confusing minefield for applicants and decision makers alike.
The term, "system", is highly misleading however and its use actually prejudges any analysis of the operation of New Zealand's system of specialist justice. In fact the development of tribunals has been anything but coherent and any attempt to corral them into a single system must by definition be "post-facto". To define tribunals as a single system, capable of overall reform requires a formalist definition (and a rather broad one at that), rather than a functional one. Such a definition is open to significant interpretation and debate. The most obvious point to note is that even if one uses a formalist approach the difference between tribunals are dramatic. Some examples can more closely be associated with courts rather than other tribunals (The Disputes Tribunal, for example) while other specialist courts (such as the Environment Court) seem closer in substance to other tribunals rather that ordinary courts. Given the difficulty in defining tribunals, the bigger question here is whether we should really be splitting off these dispute resolution mechanisms into a distinct sub-set capable of being reformed in isolation.
When one looks closely at the institutions classified as tribunals by the New Zealand Law
Commission, it is extremely difficult to find overall consistency, with a wide variety of procedures, functions and powers being utilised. Indeed, the only thing that they all clearly have in common is that they are non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms. 9 This leads us to pose a fundamental question. Are we actually looking at one "tribunal" system or many? This expertise and thus the use of lawyers. Is this really what we want? Do we really want the imposition of court based principles of natural justice in the tribunal arena? Natural Justice, as understood in New Zealand exists to ensure equality of arms between the combatants in an adversarial trial environment. However, the use of "natural justice" in a tribunal context presupposes such an adversarial approach is appropriate across the entire tribunal system. It is not clear that this approach is always desirable and it may have the effect of making tribunals cheap courts, rather than effective dispute resolution mechanisms in their own right.
A related issue is the assumption that increasing the involvement of the judiciary in the tribunal structure will improve things. Again, this may be true but the issue has not been properly considered in the Law Commission's proposals. Judges are expensive beasts and tend to come with judicial baggage. They are used to the realities of the courtroom and there is always the danger that their involvement will bring a greater judicialisation of the tribunal process. The greater use of lawyers across the tribunal system, which appears to flow from the Law Commission's approach, creates the danger of increased formality and thus increased costs in these non-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms.
The Law Commission, it is report, deals with the issue costs and particularly the cost of legal advice in relation to a number of tribunals. The response is to increase the Legal Aid entitlement for complainants. However, this seems to again pre-suppose a judicial approach to tribunals. If we need a lawyer to take a complaint, the default position should not be to get the state to pay the lawyer. Instead, we need to be asking the question why do we need lawyer in a non-judicial dispute resolution environment?
The Future of New Zealand Tribunals
Overall, these criticisms can be traced back to the structural approach of the proposals and the failure to address the underlying functions of the tribunals. To some extent this may reflect the remit given to the Commission and the limits that the Ministry of Justice imposed upon the reform programme. There is much talk in the Law Commission's Issues paper of the needs of individuals but the final results are extremely disappointing. 17 There is talk of a single "shop front" approach to those individuals seeking redress. This is to be commended and should be a key feature of the proposals. It is never elaborated upon. In a time of economic hardship a reform like this is a prime opportunity to reduce transaction costs in administrative justice. The reasons for this lack of user focus are to be found not in the final report but in the structural 17 Issues paper approach taken throughout the reform process.
Despite the comments above, the purpose of this paper is not to criticise the work of the Law Commission in its efforts to reform the tribunal sector in New Zealand. The project was and is a long overdue attempt to introduce some much needed rationality into the New Zealand tribunal structure. The Law Commission should be commended for its role in trying achieving this. However, in taking the approach they have the proposals run the risk of failing to address the fundamental questions surrounding the role and function of tribunals in the wider legal system. By assuming that the tribunal sector can be reformed as a whole, the proposals do not sufficiently the address the impact of tribunals upon the lives of individuals. Tribunals need to be seen not as a system of cheap courts, but as a part of the wider system of dispute resolution in New Zealand. These reforms have the potential to unintentionally do more of the former an reduce the very elements of the tribunal system which make it so attractive in a modern system of dispute resolution.
